Di erential Cryptanalysis is currently the most powerful tool available for analysing block ciphers, and new block ciphers need to be designed to resist it. It has been suggested that the use of S-boxes based on bent functions, with a at XOR pro le, would be immune. However our studies of di erential cryptanalysis, particularly applied to the LOKI cipher, have shown that this is not the case. In fact, this results in a relatively easily broken scheme. We show that an XOR pro le with carefully placed zeroes is required. We also show that in order to avoid some variant forms of di erential cryptanalysis, permutation P needs to be chosen to prevent easy propagation of a constant XOR value back into the same S-box. We redesign the LOKI cipher to form LOKI91, to illustrate these results, as well as to correct the key schedule to remove the formation of equivalent keys. We conclude with an overview of the security of the new cipher.
Introduction
Cryptographic research is currently a very active eld, with the need for new encryption algorithms having spurred the design of several new block ciphers 1]. The most powerful tool for analysing such block ciphers currently known is di erential cryptanalysis. It has been used to nd design de ciencies in many of the new ciphers. Some new design criteria have been proposed which are claimed to provide immunity to di erential cryptanalysis. These involve the use of S-boxes based on bent functions, selected so the resultant box has a at XOR pro le. In this paper, after presenting a brief introduction to the key concepts in di erential cryptanalysis, we will show that these new criteria do not provide the immunity claimed, but rather can result in the design of a scheme which may be relatively easily broken. What we believe is required, is an S-box with carefully placed zeroes, which signi cantly hinder the di erential cryptanalysis process.
We continue by documenting our analysis of the LOKI cipher. We report on a previously discovered di erential cryptanalysis attack, faster than exhaustive search up to 11 rounds, as well as on a new attack, using an alternate form of analysis, which is faster than exhaustive search up to 14 rounds. We also brie y note some design de ciencies in the key schedule which resulted in the generation of equivalent keys. This process highlighted some necessary additional design criteria needed to strengthen block ciphers against these attacks.
We conclude by describing the redesign of the LOKI cipher, using it to illustrate the application of these additional design principles, and make some comments on what we believe is the security of the new scheme.
Di erential Cryptanalysis

Overview
Di erential Cryptanalysis is a dynamic attack against a cipher, using a very large number of chosen plaintext pairs, which through a statistical analysis of the resulting ciphertext pairs, can be used to determine the key in use. In general, di erential cryptanalysis is much faster than exhaustive search for a certain number of rounds in the cipher, however there is a breakeven point where it becomes slower than exhaustive search. The lower the number of rounds this is, the greater the security of the cipher. Di erential Cryptanalysis was rst described by Biham and Shamir in 2], and in greater detail in 3]. These described the general technique, and its application to the analysis of the DES and the Generalised DES. Subsequent papers by them have detailed its In Di erential Cryptanalysis, a table showing the distribution of the XOR of input pairs against the XOR of output pairs is used to determine probabilities of a particular observed output pair being the result of some input pair. The general form of such a table is shown in Fig 1. To attack a multi-round block cipher, the XOR pro le is used to build n round characteristics, which have a given probability of occurring. These characteristics specify a particular input XOR, a possible output XOR, the necessary intermediate XOR's, and the probability of this occurring. In their original paper 3], Biham and Shamir describe 1,2,3 and 5 round characteristics which may be used to directly attack versions of DES up to 7 rounds. Knowing a characteristic, it is possible to infer information about the outputs for the next two rounds. To utilise this attack, a number of pairs of inputs, having the nominated input XOR, are tried, until an output XOR results which indicates that the pattern speci ed in the characteristic has occurred. Since an n round characteristic has a probability of occurrence, for most keys we can state on average, how many pairs of inputs need to be trialed before the characteristic is successfully matched. Once a suitable pair, known as a right pair, has been found, information on possible keys which could have been used, is deduced. Once this is done we have two plaintext-ciphertext pairs. We know from the ciphertext, the input to the last round. Knowing the input XOR and output XOR for this round, we can thus restrict the possible key bits used in this round, by considering those outputs with an XOR of zero, providing information on the outputs of some of the S-boxes. By then locating additional right pairs we can eventually either uniquely determine the key, or deduce su cient bits of it N round characteristics can be concatenated to form longer characteristics if the output of the rst supplies the input to the second, with probabilities multiplied together. A particularly useful characteristic is one whose output is a swapped version of its input, and which hence may be iterated with itself. This may be used to analyse an arbitrary number of rounds of the cipher, with a steadily increasing work factor. A particularly useful form is one where a . This form of characteristic is then used in the analysis of arbitrary n round forms of a cipher, until the work factor exceeds exhaustive search. These techniques are described in detail in 3].
Why Flat XOR pro les Don't Work
Given the success of di erential cryptanalysis in the analysis of block ciphers, it has become important to develop design criteria to improve the resistance of block ciphers to it, especially with several candidates having performed poorly. Dawson and Tavares 6] have proposed that the selection of S-boxes with equal probabilities for each output XOR given an input XOR (except input 0) would result in a cipher that was immune to di erential cryptanalysis (see Fig. 3 ). However a careful study of Biham and Shamir's attack on the 8 round version of DES 3], con rmed by our own analyses of LOKI, have shown that this is not the case.
Indeed the selection of such S-boxes results in a cipher which is signi cantly easier to cryptanalyse than normal. This is done by constructing a 2 round iterative characteristic of the form in Fig. 2 , with an input XOR that changes bits to one S-box only. We know we can do this, since the at XOR pro le implies that an output XOR of 0 for a speci ed input XOR will occur with Pr(1=2 n ).
When iterated over 2k rounds, this will have a probability of Pr(1=2 (k?1)n ), since you get the last round for free. Consider a 16 round DES style cryptosystem, but with S-boxes having a at XOR pro le of the form in Fig. 3 with m = 6, n = 4, and k = 8. This may be attacked by a 15-round characteristic, chosen to alter inputs to a single S-box only. This gives a probability to break with a given test pair of Pr (1=2 28 ), implying that about 2 28 pairs need to be tried to break the cipher, far easier than by exhaustive search.
Signi cance of Permutation P
Although di erential cryptanalysis may be done independent of permutation P, knowledge of a particular P may be used to construct some other useful n round characteristics for cryptanalysing a particular cipher. The most useful of these take the form of a 2 or 3 round characteristic which generate an output XOR identical to the input XOR, either directly in 2 rounds, or by oscillating between two alternate XOR values over 3 rounds. The 3 round characteristic is sensitive to the form of permutation P. This form of characteristic has been found in the original version of LOKI, as detailed below. It thus indicates that care is needed in the design of not just the S-boxes, but of all elements in function F, in order to reduce susceptibility to di erential cryptanalysis. Fig. 4 . We will refer to this version of the cipher as LOKI89 in the remainder of this paper. It is a 16 round Feistel style cipher, with a relatively straightforward key schedule, a non-linear function F = P(S(E(R K))), and four identical 12-to-8 bit S-boxes. Permutation P in LOKI has a regular structure which distributes the 8 output bits from each S-box to boxes +3 +2 +1 0 +3 +2 +1 0] in the next round. Its S-box consists of 16 1-1 functions, based on exponentiation in a Galois eld GF (2 8 ) (see 8]), with the general structure shown in Fig. 4. 
Security of LOKI89
Initial testing of the statistical and complexity properties of LOKI89 indicated that its properties were very similar to those exhibited by DES, FEAL8 and Lucifer 9], results that were very encouraging. Initial examination of the XOR pro le of the LOKI89 S-box also suggested that it should be more resistant than DES to di erential cryptanalysis. This characteristic is iterated to 8 rounds with Pr(2 ?52:48 ), allowing up to 10 rounds to be broken faster than by exhaustive key space search. This is a signi cantly better result than for the DES. The authors have veri ed this attack. The authors have subsequently found an alternate 3 round iterative characteristic, attacking S-box 3, with an output XOR identical to the input XOR. Since permutation P in LOKI89 permutes some output bits back to the same S-box in the next round, this allows the characteristic to be iterated. It has the form: In the light of these results, the authors have devised some additional design guidelines to those originally used in the design of LOKI, and have applied them in the development of a new version, LOKI91.
Redesign of LOKI 4.1 Some Additional Design Guidelines
To improve the resistance of a cipher to di erential cryptanalysis, and to remove problems with the key schedule, the following guidelines were used:
analyse the key schedule to minimize the generation of equivalent key, or related (key, plaintext) pairs. minimise the probability that a non-zero input XOR results in a zero output XOR, or in an identical output XOR, particularly for inputs that di er in only 1 or 2 S-boxes. ensure the cipher has su cient rounds so that exhaustive search is the optimal attack (ie have insu cient pairs to do di erential cryptanalysis). ensure that there is no way to make all S-boxes give 0 outputs, to increase the ciphers security when used in hashing modes. These criteria were used when selecting the changes made to the LOKI structure, detailed below.
Design of LOKI91
LOKI91 is the revised version, developed to address the results detailed above. Changes have been made to two aspects of the LOKI structure. Firstly the key schedule has been amended in several places to signi cantly reduce the number of weak keys. Secondly the function used in the S-boxes has been altered to improve its utility in hashing applications, and to improve its immunity to di erential cryptanalysis. In more detail, the four changes made to the original design were:
1. change key schedule to swap halves after every second round 2. change key rotations to alternate between ROT13 and ROT12 3. remove initial and nal XORs of key with plaintext and ciphertext (3) where + and refer to arithmetic addition and multiplication, is addition modulo 2, and the exponentiation is performed in GF (2 8 ). The generator polynomials used (g row ) are as for LOKI89 7] . The overall structure of LOKI91 that results from these changes is shown in Fig. 5 .
The key schedule changes remove all but a single bit complementation property, leaving an e ective search space of 2 63 keys under a chosen-plaintext attack. It reduces key equivalences to a single bit complementation property, similar to that of the DES where LOKI(P; K) = LOKI(P; K), by reducing the solutions to each of Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 to one, and removing the independence between them by altering the swapping to every two rounds. It also greatly reduces the number of weak and semi-weak keys to those shown in Table 1 (where an * denotes weak keys). The DES also has 16 weak and semi-weak keys.
Encrypt Key
Decrypt Key 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 * 00000000aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaa00000000 0000000055555555 5555555500000000 00000000ffffffff ffffffff00000000 aaaaaaaa00000000 00000000aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa * aaaaaaaa55555555 55555555aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaffffffff ffffffffaaaaaaaa 5555555500000000 0000000055555555 55555555aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaa55555555 5555555555555555 5555555555555555 * 55555555ffffffff ffffffff55555555 ffffffff00000000 00000000ffffffff ffffffffaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaffffffff ffffffff55555555 55555555ffffffff ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff * Table 1 : LOKI91 Weak and semi-weak key pairs
The removal of the initial and nal XORs became necessary with the change in the swap locations, since otherwise it would have resulted in cancellation of the keys bits at the input to E in some rounds. This change does a ect the growth of ciphertext dependence on keys bits (see 11]), increasing it from 3 to 5 rounds. This still compares favorably with the DES which takes either 5 or 7 rounds, dependent on the type of dependency analysed. This change also greatly assisted in the reduction of the number of equivalent keys.
The new Sfn uses arithmetic addition and multiplication, as these are nonlinear when used in GF (2 8 ). The addition modulo two of the row with ff 16 ensures that an all zero input gives a non-zero output, thus removing the major de ciency of LOKI89 when used as a hash function. The result of the addition and multiplication is masked with ff 16 to restrict the value to lie with GF( 2 8 ), prior to the exponentiation in that eld. The new function reduces the probabilities of occurance of n round iterative characteristics, useful for di erential cryptanalysis, to be as low as possible. With the new function, LOKI91 is theoretically breakable faster than an exhaustive key space search in: up to 10 rounds using a 2 round characteristic with the f(x 0 )? > 0 0 mapping occuring with Pr(122=1048576) up to 12 rounds using a 3 round characteristic with the f(x 0 )? > x 0 mapping occuring with Pr(16=4096) (used twice) At 16 rounds, cryptanalysis is generally impossible, as insu cient pairs are available to complete the analysis. It would require: 2 80 pairs using the 3 round characterisitic, or 2 92 pairs using the 2 round characteristic compared to a total of 2 63 possible plaintext pairs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that a at XOR pro le does not provide immunity to di erential cryptanalysis, but in fact leads to a very insecure scheme. Instead a carefully chosen XOR pro le, with suitably placed 0 entries is required to satisfy the new design guidelines we have identi ed. We also note an analysis of key schedules, which can be used to determine the number of equivalent keys. We conclude with the application of these results to the design of LOKI91.
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Appendix A -Speci cation of LOKI91
Encryption
The overall structure of LOKI91 is shown in Fig. 5 , and is speci ed as follows. The 64-bit input block X is partitioned into two 32-bit blocks L and R. Similarly, the 64-bit key is partitioned into two 32-bit blocks KL and KR.
L 0 = L KL 0 = KL R 0 = R KR 0 = KR (4) The key-dependent computation consists (except for a nal interchange of blocks) of 16 rounds (iterations) of a set of operations. Each iteration includes the calculation of the encryption function f. This is a concatenation of a modulo 2 addition and three functions E, S, and P. Function f takes as input the 32-bit right data half R i?1 and the 32-bit left key half KL i produced by the key schedule KS (denoted K i below), and which produces a 32-bit result which is added modulo 2 to the left data half L i?1 . The two data halves are then interchanged (except after the last round). Each round may thus be characterised 
The component functions E, S, and P are described later.
The key schedule KS is responsible for deriving the sub-keys K i , and is de ned as follows: the 64-bit key K is partitioned into two 32-bit halves KL and KR. In each round i, the sub-key K i is the current left half of the key KL i?1 . On odd numbered rounds (1, 3, 5, etc) , this half is then rotated 12 bits to the left. On even numbered rounds (2, 4, 6, etc) , this half is then rotated 13 bits to the left, and the key halves are interchanged.
This may be de ned for odd numbered rounds as: 
Finally after the 16 rounds, the two output block halves L 16 and R 16 are then concatenated together to form the output block Y . This is de ned as (note the swap of data halves to undo the nal interchange in Eq.5):
The decryption computation is identical to that used for encryption, save that the partial keys used as input to the function f in each round are calculated in reverse order. The rotations are to the right, and an initial pre-rotation of 8 places is needed to form the key pattern. The encryption function f is a concatenation of a modulo 2 addition and three functions E, S, and P, which takes as input the 32-bit right data half R i?1 and the 32-bit left key half KL i , and produces a 32-bit result which is added modulo 2 to the left data half L i?1 . f(R i?1; K i ) = P(S(E(R i?1 K i ))) (9) The modulo 2 addition of the key and data halves ensures that the output of f will be a complex function of both of these values.
The expansion function E takes a 32-bit input and produces a 48-bit output block, composed of four 12-bit blocks which form the inputs to four S-boxes in function f. Function E selects consecutive blocks of twelve bits as inputs to S-boxes S(4), S(3), S(2), and S(1) respectively, as follows: This is shown in full in Table 2 (10) where gen row is an irreducible polynomial in GF (2 8 ), and e row is the (constant 31) exponent used in forming Sfn row (col). The generators and exponents to be used in the 16 S-functions in LOKI91 are speci ed in Table 3 . For ease of implementation in hardware, this function can also be written as:
Sfn row (col) = (col + ((row)j(row << 4))&ff 16 ) 31 mod g row (11) The permutation function P provides di usion of the outputs from the four S-boxes across the inputs of all S-boxes in the next round. It takes the 32-bit concatenated outputs from the S-boxes, and distributes them over all the inputs for the next round via a regular wire crossing which takes bits from the outputs of each S-box in turn, as de ned in Table 4 which speci es the source bit for output bits 31 to 0 respectively.
Test Data
A single test triplet for the LOKI91 primitive is listed below.
#
Single LOKI91 Certification triplet # data is saved as (key, plaintext, ciphertext) hex triplets # 3849674c2602319e 126898d55e911500 c86caec1e3b7b17e
